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 We study the impact of oil excises across regions and households in Belgium.
 Lower income groups gain if the revenue is used to raise welfare payments.
 If labour taxes are reduced, the reform is only slightly regressive.
 The differential impact across households is driven by factor price changes.
 Sector composition is a crucial determinant for impact variation across regions.
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a b s t r a c t
We analyse the macroeconomic and distributional effects of increased oil excises in Belgium by
combining a regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with a microsimulation framework
that exploits the rich detail of household-level data. The link between the CGE model and the microlevel
is top–down, feeding changes in commodity prices, factor returns and employment by sector into a
microsimulation model. The results suggest that policymakers face an equity-efficiency trade-off driven
by the choice of revenue recycling options. When the additional revenue is used to raise welfare
transfers to households, the reform is beneficial for lower income groups, but output levels decrease in
all regions. However, when the energy tax revenue is used to lower distortionary labour taxes, the tax
shift is slightly regressive. In this case, national GDP is hardly affected but regional production levels
diverge. The impact of the environmental tax reform on income distribution depends strongly on
changes in factor prices and welfare payments, whereas sector composition is an important determinant
for regional impact variation.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Policies to reduce carbon emission have become ubiquitous in
both academic discussions and popular debates. Besides the
differential impact of climate change across countries around the
globe, one might wonder how energy and emission reduction
policies affect inequality within countries. The potential regressiv-
ity of energy taxes may form an important obstacle for political
acceptability of environmental fiscal reforms. In addition, regional
economic impacts are likely to play a crucial role in the debate
when politicians represent voters of different regions. This paper
studies the effects of increased oil excises on the distribution of
household incomes and on regional economic activity in Belgium.
Environmental taxes can be argued to be regressive for various
reasons. First of all, indirect taxation on the carbon or energy
intensity of goods can raise the prices for certain commodities (e.g.
oil fuel and petrol). Possibly, the consumption of these goods takes
up a larger share of the budget for low-income households, who
would therefore be affected disproportionately. Second, carbon
taxes or tradable permit schemes can have a significant impact on
factor incomes. The extent to which households depend on labour
and capital income typically varies along the income distribution.
The first argument depends on relative product prices and affects
households on the uses side, whereas the second one is driven by
relative factor prices and is referred to as an effect on the sources
side (Musgrave, 1959). Other factors that may influence the
incidence of environmental taxes are differences in endowments
and sector composition across regions (Rausch et al., 2011), the
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distribution of benefits in environmental quality, and the extent to
which all these effects capitalise into land prices (Fullerton, 2011).
Research reports usually find that environmental taxes are
slightly regressive in developed countries (see Harrison (1995),
Speck (1999) or Zhang and Baranzini (2004)). Studies that apply
microsimulation techniques using household-level data tend to
confirm these findings. For instance, Johnson et al. (1990) simulated
expenditure responses to changes in consumption prices of energy,
petrol and food. The results suggest that particularly price changes
of energy products caused by e.g. value-added taxes or carbon taxes
are likely to raise inequality. Decoster (1995) performed a similar
analysis for the effects of a carbon tax in Belgium. His analysis
identifies initial expenditure patterns as important drivers of the
redistributive effects of indirect tax reforms. The heterogeneity in
consumption responses to price changes seems to play a subordi-
nate role for the distributional impact. A third illustration of a study
into the regressive nature of green taxes using household-level data
is provided by Metcalf (1999). He emphasises the potential of using
the additional revenue to alleviate the burden of the tax reform for
households at the lower end of the income distribution. For a more
comprehensive review and discussion of the literature on environ-
mental taxes, we refer to the chapter in the Mirrlees Review by
Fullerton et al. (2010). In general, microsimulation is well-suited to
address distributional implications of tax reforms because it allows
incorporating the heterogeneity in characteristics and behaviour
across individuals or households. However, analyses in partial
equilibrium have common limitations, such as exogenous incidence
of taxes and the absence of sectoral linkages that may be useful in
assessing the economy-wide impact of policy reforms. For a more
elaborate discussion on the use of microsimulation for inequality
analyses, we refer to Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006).
The importance of initial tax distortions (Bovenberg and
De Mooij, 1994) and revenue recycling options (Parry, 1995) in the
analysis of environmental tax reforms calls for a general equilibrium
framework in which consumption prices and wages are determined
endogenously. Aggregate models in a general equilibrium setting,
contrary to microsimulation, usually lack a sufficient degree of detail
to adequately analyse welfare impacts for different groups of society.
These studies therefore tend to focus on efficiency aspects and often
present aggregate results in terms of economy-wide or sectoral
production and pollution. One notable exception, however, is pre-
sented by Proost and Van Regemorter (1995). They applied a general
equilibrium model that deviates from the assumption of one repre-
sentative household by introducing four types of consumers, differing
in employment status and sources of income (labour, capital and
welfare payments). The dynamic simulations for an increase in excises
on energy products compare two ways of recycling the additional tax
revenue: raising the welfare payments or reducing employers' social
security contributions. Whereas most studies that ignore equity
aspects confirm the weak double dividend hypothesis1 (see Goulder,
1995), Proost and Van Regemorter argue that this hypothesis need not
hold when equity concerns are taken into account. The results under a
flexible wage regime show that an inequality averse policymaker may
prefer to raise the welfare benefits instead of lowering social security
contributions. The reason is that welfare payments accrue more to the
poor, whereas a reduction in labour taxes would mostly benefit the
higher income groups.
A more recent strand of literature attempts to reconcile aggre-
gate and disaggregate perspectives by linking Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models with microsimulation models (MSM).
The advantage of this approach is that it includes general
equilibrium feedbacks but nevertheless exploits the full detail
captured by household-level data. Several variants of this approach
can be distinguished2. Chen and Ravallion (2004) illustrate a
straightforward top-down link, transmitting CGE changes in prices
and wages to household survey data to analyse the distributional
impact of China's accession to the World Trade Organization. Their
analysis assumes quantities are fixed, which comes down to
unchanged labour and consumption behaviour of households. A
second type of link strives for some consistency by reweighting the
microdata in accordance with the CGE aggregates. Buddelmeyer
et al. (2012) apply this approach to study the effects of climate
change policies on income distribution in Australia. Employment
and population changes are accounted for by adapting the sample
weights of the households in the microdata. Since our work builds
largely on methods presented by Buddelmeyer et al., this procedure
for linking the CGE model with microsimulationwill be discussed in
more detail in Section 2.2. The authors analyse two scenarios (80
and 90% CO2 reduction below the level in the year 2000 by 2050) of
an Emissions Trading Scheme for Australia. The revenue generated
by this programme is redistributed lump sum to the households. In
aggregate, real net incomes seem to drop after the reform. For the
lowest income quintile, however, the income loss is overcompen-
sated by the lump sum transfer, such that overall income inequality
as measured by the Gini index is reduced. Top-down links with
explicit modelling of household behaviour at the microlevel can be
found in Labandeira et al. (2009), who used a demand system on
microdata, or in Robilliard et al. (2008), who employed a micro-
module with endogenous occupational choices. Third, some studies
develop an iterative procedure between aggregate and disaggregate
models, referred to as a top-down/bottom-up method, which may
be useful when the reform under study causes important microlevel
changes that have effects on a macroscale (Savard, 2003). Finally, for
a fully integrated CGE model based on household-level data we
refer to the ambitious work of Rausch et al. (2011), who applied
algorithms developed by Rutherford and Tarr (2008). Over 15,000
households are incorporated as individual agents in a general
equilibrium setting in order to analyse carbon taxes in the US.
One of the conclusions claims that a progressive impact of carbon
pricing on the sources side can offset regressivity on the uses side.
Interestingly, the authors point out impact variation across racial
and ethnic groups, reflecting underlying differences in income and
expenditure patterns.
This paper uses a top-down link between a regional compu-
table general equilibrium model and a non-behavioural micro-
simulation framework. We analyse the distributional effects of an
increase in excises on mineral oil in Belgium, taking into account
employment, consumption price and income changes. In addition
to describing the results in terms of household's characteristics,
we break down the impact of the energy tax reform in employ-
ment, income and price effects. The next section discusses the
methodology. First, we briefly describe the most important fea-
tures of the CGE model. Next, we provide details on how we build
the bridge between the CGE model and microsimulation. Results
are presented in Section 3. The final section concludes.
2. Methods
2.1. CGE model
In this section we set out the most important features of the
regional CGE model we have developed for this exercise. It is
1 The ‘weak double dividend’ hypothesis states that recycling the additional
revenue of increased environmental taxes by lowering pre-existing distortionary
(e.g. labour) taxes is less costly than redistributing the extra tax income as lump
sum transfers.
2 An overview (of applications in international trade literature) is given by
Hertel and Reimer (2005).
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largely based on the GEM-E3 model. For a full description, we refer
to the model manual3. Here, we use a version of the model that
covers Belgium and the rest of the world. We extend this frame-
work by introducing the three regions in Belgium in a bottom-up
fashion. For each of the three regions in Belgium, we model a
representative household and 18 industry sectors. This way we
take into account important differences in sectoral composition
between the regions (see Table 1). One federal and three regional
governments are included, as well as trade with the rest of
the world.
Households maximise a Stone–Geary utility function by choos-
ing the desired amounts of leisure and consumption goods, taking
current prices (myopic) as given. The leisure choice determines the
amount of labour supplied by the households. Expenditure on
commodities is further allocated between non-durables (11 cate-
gories) and a stock of durable goods (‘Heating’ and ‘Transport
equipment’). The use of a durable involves the consumption of
fuels, a non-durable. Excises are levied on this linked consump-
tion. The modelling approach ensures that fuel prices affect the
decision to acquire the durable (e.g. how many cars will be
bought) and the use of the durable (e.g. the kilometres driven
with the car). The diagram in Fig. A.1 in Appendix A visualises the
structure of the household side. Note that this modelling approach
abstracts from differences in skill levels between households and
assumes all unemployment is voluntary.
Firms maximise profits subject to a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) production technology with constant returns
to scale. A nested structure, shown in Fig. A.2 in Appendix A,
allows for more complex substitution patterns. On the first level,
firms can substitute a stock of capital against a bundle of labour,
energy and materials. The model is recursive dynamic through
accumulation of capital over time. Within one period, the stock of
capital is fixed, but each industry branch makes an investment
decision (based on exogenous growth expectations and current
prices) in order to obtain the desired capital stock in the next
period. As a result, high capital prices in one period may lead to
more investment. This in turn will expand the capital supply in the
next period, thereby lowering capital prices. The investment
demand is converted (using an investment matrix) into a demand
for the outputs of the different sectors. Energy inputs in the
production process are subdivided into electricity, oil, gas and
coal. On the firm side, excises on oil are levied on the volume of oil
inputs in the production process. Table 1 shows the sector
composition in the three regions in Belgium. The relatively high
output share of energy intensive firms in Wallonia and the relative
importance of service sectors in Brussels highlight the interregio-
nal differences in industry structure in Belgium.
Governments' behaviour is exogenous. Several government
instruments are included, such as direct, indirect and energy
taxes, welfare payments, subsidies and import duties. Federal
and regional government budgets are interlinked via the Special
Finance Act that organises the sharing of revenues of federal taxes
(personal income taxes and VAT). The main distribution mechan-
isms are based on regional populations, the amount of personal
income tax revenue collected in a region and a solidarity compo-
nent that allocates funds to regions where personal income tax
revenue per capita is lower than the national average. Interna-
tional trade is modelled according to the standard Armington
(1969) assumption, which states that domestically produced goods
and imports are imperfect substitutes. Exports are based on
exogenous world demand, following the same reasoning. For
Belgium, the assumption of a small open economy seems obvious,
so we take world prices as exogenous and uninfluenced by the
import demand. Interregional trade is not explicitly modelled.
Labour, goods and capital markets are simultaneously in
equilibrium. First, labour supply matches labour demand in a
countrywide, perfectly competitive labour market. This implicitly
assumes perfect labour mobility (costless commuting). As a result,
there is one wage that clears the labour market at a national level,
where labour supply and demand are obtained by adding up the
labour supply and demand in the three regions. Note that by
assuming perfect competition, we abstract from union wage
bargaining, involuntary unemployment and other labour market
frictions. Our model set-up therefore only includes voluntary
unemployment, driven by the household's choice of leisure over
consumption for a given wage rate. Second, household, govern-
ment, investment and export demand for each consumption
category is transformed (by means of a consumption matrix) into
demands for the outputs of each industry branch. The commodity
market is in equilibrium at the country level, such that consump-
tion prices are the same across the country (aside from small
differences in regional taxation). We neglect cross-border shop-
ping. Third, within each period, the capital stock is fixed per region
and per industry sector. Capital supply therefore comes down to
the existing stock of capital in one period. The capital market
Table 1
Share in output by region and sector (IO table, 2005).
Industry branches CPA aggregation Belgium Brussels Flanders Wallonia
1. Agriculture 01, 02, 05 1.53 0.64 1.72 1.74
2. Coal 10 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.11
3. Crude oil and refined oil products 23 3.26 6.90 2.68 1.97
4. Natural gas 11 0.43 0.24 0.62 0.02
5. Electric power 12, 40 1.88 2.97 1.51 2.06
6. Ferrous and non-ferrous ore and metals 13, 27, 28 4.69 1.28 4.90 6.87
7. Chemical products 24 7.51 4.08 8.11 8.60
8. Other energy intensive industries 14, 21, 26 3.15 1.54 2.95 5.03
9. Electrical goods 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 6.23 3.82 6.99 6.01
10. Transport equipment 34, 35 5.91 4.65 7.48 2.40
11. Other equipment goods 20, 22, 25, 36, 37 4.38 2.76 5.03 3.80
12. Consumer goods industries 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 7.42 4.37 8.37 7.17
13. Building and construction 45 5.52 4.14 5.77 5.91
14. Land transport 60 1.94 1.63 1.94 2.20
15. Other transport 61, 62 0.87 0.68 1.08 0.41
16. Credit and insurance 65, 66, 67 4.70 11.12 3.20 3.79
17. Other market services 50, 51, 52, 55, 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 29.45 36.52 28.06 27.68
18. Non-market services 41, 75, 80, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95 11.05 12.58 9.52 14.24
3 More extensive model documentation (Capros et al., 2013) and related
publications can be found on www.GEM-E3.net. For a recent application of the
world GEM-E3 model, we refer to Ciscar et al. (2013).
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equilibrium, where capital demand is determined by investment
choices based on exogenous growth expectations and current
prices (myopic), determines the price of capital. Part of the
return on capital is paid out to households as capital owners (in
Section 2.2 we will therefore assume that changes in self-
employment income in the microdata follow the variation in the
return on capital). Another part is retained within the firm, of
which a fraction is paid out to the households as a dividend. The
model is implicitly closed by imposing the zero profit condition,
complete use of income, the equilibrium on the goods market and
the government budget constraint. Household savings are mod-
elled as a residual category, indicating the amount of income left
after consumption expenditures.
The model's parameters are fixed in the calibration, such that
the initial model equilibrium matches the observed situation in
the base year (2005). The intuition of the calibration procedure is
to use available data sources to set the values of all variables and
parameters in an equation, except one. The remaining parameter is
then obtained by rewriting the equation. Input-output tables,
regional and national government accounts, household accounts,
employment and wage data (made available to us by the Federal
Planning Bureau) are combined in a consistent way to construct
the social accounting matrices for the three regions. Input-output
tables determine intermediate consumption linkages between
firms. The model is therefore well-suited to address the
economy-wide impact of policy reforms. Government and house-
hold accounts serve to pin down transfers between agents in the
base year. Data on population, employment and wages are used to
derive labour market parameters. Population projections are
provided by Eurostat. Exogenous sector growth expectations, a
factor that influences investment demand, are assumed to be
around 2% for manufacturing industries, in line with OECD (2012)
projections, and slightly higher (3%) for services sectors in the
baseline. The consumption price elasticities vary across the differ-
ent expenditure categories, but are identical across regions. Like-
wise, we assume that the substitution elasticities in production are
the same in the three regions.
Finally, carbon emissions of firms are based on regional energy
balance sheets, which contain information on the energy sources
used in each sector, combined with default emission coefficients
from IPCC (2006). Together with energy tax rates from the
International Energy Agency (IEA), the energy balance sheets
additionally serve to calibrate the initial level of energy taxes.
Important exemptions for agriculture and water and air transport
have been taken into account. In calculating the CO2 emissions by
households, we distinguish between the use of fuels for heating
and transport purposes.
2.2. Link with microsimulation
The approach to combine the CGE model with microsimulation
followed here is a top-down method, inspired by the work of
Buddelmeyer et al. (2012). Our microsimulation framework is non-
behavioural, which means that household behaviour is not mod-
elled explicitly at the microlevel. Herault (2010) compared the link
of a CGE model with two types of microsimulation: a behavioural
module with endogenous occupational choices and a non-
behavioural framework with a reweighting procedure to account
for employment and population changes. The behavioural
approach can take heterogeneity of preferences into account and
may better capture employment changes both at the intensive and
the extensive margin. The reweighting approach may introduce a
small bias, since household characteristics or preferences that may
affect the probability of labour market responses are not consid-
ered. Nevertheless, Herault (2010) suggested this approach seems
to give a good approximation of distributional effects and is
simpler to apply. Also note that we do not use the output of the
microsimulation as further input into the CGE model; the link is
uni-directional. The CGE simulations result in changes in employ-
ment, consumption prices and factor returns, which are subse-
quently used as inputs for the household-level analysis.
The microdata we use draws from the European Union Statis-
tics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), survey data that
contains information on labour supply status (and industry sector,
if the person is employed), education levels, age, region of
residence, factor incomes, household composition and other
characteristics of over 14,000 Belgian individuals. Expenditure
data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) is used as described
below (in the fifth step). Decoster et al. (2013) described how the
data from the EU-SILC and the HBS are combined.
The methodology can be summarised in five steps. The first
step is concerned with consistency between aggregate and dis-
aggregate data sources. Adding up the employment figures from
the household survey does not reproduce the employment totals
that can be found in regional accounts. We align the employment
figures by changing the sample weights of the microdata, with as
little deviation (measured by a chi-square function) from the
original sample weights as possible, such that the labour supply
in each region matches the aggregate numbers from the CGE
model (Li in region i). In addition, we keep the total size of the
population (N) constant. In doing so, we generate the baseline pre-
reform dataset. The reweighting procedure follows the methods
described in Cai et al. (2006). Minimising the deviation D (mea-
sured by a chi-square function) between household sample
weights sk and new weights w0,k (subscript 0 refers to the pre-
reform situation, subscript k represents the households in the
sample, k¼1,…,K), subject to constraints for regional labour
supply (lk,i is the labour supply of household k living in region i)
and population size comes down to solving the following optimi-
sation problem:
Min
w0;k
D¼ 1
2
∑
K
k ¼ 1
ðw0;kskÞ2
sk
s:t: Li ¼ ∑
K
k ¼ 1
w0;klk;i
N¼ ∑
K
k ¼ 1
sk ¼ ∑
K
k ¼ 1
w0;k
In a second step, we use the same reweighting method to
translate employment changes, induced by the policy reform, to
the microlevel. Since both the aggregate and the household data
contain information on industry sector, variations in employment
can be taken into account by industry sector (again with the
additional constraint on the population size). After matching both
data sources, seven industry sectors remain, as shown in Table B.1
in Appendix B. This is a simple way to achieve consistency
between aggregate and household level employment changes.
The reweighting in this step thus minimises the distance between
the weights obtained from the previous step (w0,k) and a new set
of weights (w1,k). The constraints include employment totals for
seven sectors and the total size of the population. A more
advanced method to incorporate these variations at the microlevel
would be to model behavioural reactions, for instance by means of
a discrete choice labour supply model.
Furthermore, a policy reform can affect factor incomes (sources
side). Fig. C.1 in Appendix C illustrates the extent to which
different income groups rely on particular sources of income. For
instance, the lowest income group receives the highest amount of
unemployment benefits, whereas employment, self-employment
and investment income is largest in the highest income group. The
third step brings the real changes in welfare payments (e.g.
pensions and unemployment benefits), wages, self-employment
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income and investment income (e.g. dividends, as mentioned in
Section 2.1), as predicted by the CGE, to the microdata by uprating
households' income by source. Note that we transmit the real
percentage changes. By using ‘real’ changes, there is no need to
adapt the tax-benefit system to new price levels in the next step.
The choice for percentage changes rather than absolute differences
is driven by differences in absolute numbers between aggregate
and microlevel data. Table 2 compares the components of house-
hold disposable income in both data sources in 2005 (EU-SILC
2006). The frequently encountered problem of under-reporting of
capital income in household surveys is apparent from this
comparison.
When households' incomes alter, some families may no longer
be entitled to certain means-tested benefits, such as income
support. Others start receiving benefits they were not eligible for
in the pre-reform situation. In Belgium, the guaranteed minimum
income is an example of a means-tested benefit scheme: only
individuals with an income below a needs-adjusted threshold are
eligible for this type of transfer. A tax-benefit calculator is
designed to take these effects into account. The fourth step
therefore uses EUROMOD to generate net disposable incomes.
EUROMOD is an arithmetic microsimulation model that contains a
detailed modelling of the legislative framework concerning taxes
and benefits for the countries of the EU27, including Belgium. For
more details on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2001). Note that the
uprating procedure in the previous step adjusts the total amount
of welfare payments, whereas this step takes into account changes
in eligibility.
Finally, varying levels of excise taxes will result in different
consumption prices (uses side). The extent to which a household is
affected by these price changes depends on expenditure patterns.
Table 3 shows the initial expenditure patterns for the 13 con-
sumption categories (along with the COICOP code aggregation) by
household income groups. The budget shares illustrate that food
(category 1), housing (3) and heating fuels (4) clearly take up a
larger share of the budget for lower income deciles. In addition, a
comparison of budget shares in aggregate data and microdata
shows roughly the same expenditure pattern (in the last two
columns of Table 3). The final step aims at incorporating the
impact variation on the ‘uses side’ by constructing household-
specific consumption price indices (CPIk). Based on expenditures
from the HBS and price changes derived from the CGE simulations,
we compute this index for household k as
CPIk ¼
∑cðp1;c=p0;cÞec;k
∑cec;k
;
where p0;c and p1;c are the prices of consumption category c
(c¼ 1;…;13) before and after the reform respectively and ec;k is
the expenditure by household k on commodity c. This household-
specific price index, used to deflate incomes, will be higher for
households who spend a large share of their budget on goods that
experience a strong price increase. We do not include second
order welfare effects caused by changes in consumption. A
demand system could be estimated to model consumption beha-
viour. We refer to Labandeira et al. (2009) for an application on
energy taxes. This approach is not followed here, as the results of
Decoster (1995) suggest that the distributional impact of an
environmental tax reform does not crucially depend on changes
in consumption behaviour.
3. Results and discussion
This section first describes the two budget neutral policy
reforms we analyse. Next, we discuss the impact on aggregate
economic indicators and carbon emissions for the three regions in
Belgium (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia). Before going into the
distributional implications (Section 3.4), we shed light on the
sensitivity of the results. In Section 3.5, we decompose the results
to distinguish the effects on the sources (income) and uses
(expenditure) side. The sixth and final subsection studies char-
acteristics of winners and losers.
3.1. Scenario description
We study two scenarios that double the federal excises on
mineral oil. In terms of tax revenue, the excises on mineral oil are
the most important environmental tax in Belgium. Generating
slightly over 3.7 billion € in 2005 (around 1.2% of GDP), this tax
represents more than half of all environmental taxes (Eurostat, 2005).
Table 2
Comparison of household income in aggregate data (CGE) and microdata (MSM).
Household income
(Million €, 2005)
CGE MSM Difference (%)
Employment income 116,805 131,819 11.39
Self-employment income 30,496 19,534 56.12
Capital income (dividends etc.) 25,731 5209 393.96
Benefits received 56,041 51,524 8.77
Income taxes 40,863 40,682 0.44
Social contributions 19,290 20,558 6.17
Disposable income 168,920 146,845 15.03
Table 3
Expenditure shares by consumption categories and income deciles.
Expenditure categories COICOP aggregation Low inc. Income deciles High inc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Microdata average CGE
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 1 22.7 22.3 21.9 21.2 20.6 19.4 19.2 18.8 18 16.9 20 17.5
2. Clothing and footwear 2 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 5.9 5 5.6
3. Housing and water expenses 3111, 3113, 3114, 3261 18.5 15.3 13.6 12.4 11.4 9.7 9.2 8.2 7.5 6.5 11 16.6
4. Fuels and power 32 (without 3261) 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.3 6.8 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.2 6.6 4.3
5. Housing furniture and operation 4 (without 4311) 4.2 4.5 4.9 5 5.2 5.4 5.8 6 6.4 7 5.5 5.3
6. Heating and cooking appliances 4311 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.7
7. Medical care and health expenses 5 6.2 6.5 7 6.4 6 5.5 5.4 5.2 5 4.9 5.8 4.6
8. Transport equipment 61, 62 (without 6221) 4.7 5.2 5.1 6.1 6.7 8.8 8 8.7 9.1 10.4 7.4 7.9
9. Operation of transport equipment 6221 3.4 3.6 3.7 4 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.2 3.7 4 6.8
10. Purchased transport 63 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.2
11. Telecommunication services 64 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.7 2.1
12. Recreation, entertainment, etc. 7 13.4 15.2 15.8 17.1 17.9 18.5 19.3 20 20.7 21.4 18.1 14.1
13. Other services 8 10.5 11.1 11.7 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.6 12.8 13.4 14 12.2 13.1
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Almost 45% is paid by households; the remaining revenue is
collected from firms. Note that important exemptions hold for
agriculture, air and water transport sectors. How the additional tax
revenue of the reform is recycled can have important macroeco-
nomic and distributional consequences. The choice of revenue
recycling option distinguishes the two scenarios.
 In the ‘Transfer Scenario’, the additional revenue is used to
increase the welfare payments by around 5%. These payments
include pensions, unemployment benefits, child allowances,
health benefits and various smaller transfers (family, education,
housing, social assistance, and disability).
 In the ‘Labour Tax Scenario’, employers' social security con-
tributions are reduced by approximately 2 percentage points
(from 26% to 24%). Note that taxes on labour in Belgium are
among the highest in Europe, whereas the environmental taxes
(including energy, transport and environmental and resource
taxes) are relatively low compared to other EU countries
(Eurostat, 2005). As argued by Bovenberg and De Mooij
(1994), the initial tax distortions can be an important factor
driving the results.
Note that both scenarios are budget neutral for the federal
government. For clarification, we state the relation between the
wage W, the labour cost faced by firms pL and the wage received
by the worker IL as
pL ¼
W
1τSS;F
IL ¼ ð1τSS;HÞð1τDT Þw;
where τSS;F and τSS;H are the social security contributions on the
firm and household side respectively. Direct taxes are represented
by τDT .
3.2. Aggregate results
The energy tax increase we study is substantial, affects both
producer and consumer side and can be expected to have a
significant economy-wide impact. The macro-level impact pre-
dicted by the CGE model is displayed in Table 4. We present the
results as percentage differences from the baseline in the year
2050 only, as the results for other years yield the same
conclusions.
In the Transfer Scenario, the tax increase raises production
costs and influences the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP, in
volume) negatively. Although production seems to decrease in all
three regions, Wallonia appears to be affected more strongly,
whereas Brussels experiences only a small drop in output.
The reason is the importance of energy-intensive industries in
Wallonia, which are particularly affected by an increase in oil
excises. Brussels, on the contrary, mainly hosts headquarters and
financial services. The regional variation becomes more apparent
when looking at the evolution of employment. The decrease in
employment in Flanders and Wallonia causes a downward pres-
sure on the real wage, as shown in the lower part of Table 4.
Together with an increase in costs for oil as an input in production,
this lowers the relative cost of labour, which leads to an increase in
employment in Brussels. These results highlight the implications
of a shared labour market, where firms from different regions hire
workers from a common pool of labour. As such, the labour market
is an important mechanism for interregional interactions. Via
changes in wages, the impact of a policy reform in one region
can spill over into one of the neighbouring regions. Despite the
reduction in real wage, household consumption rises, driven by
the strong increase in welfare payments. The reduction in invest-
ment is lower than the overall output reduction, indicating a shift
towards capital (for Brussels investment even increases). In terms
of environmental impact, the results suggest that carbon emis-
sions decrease in all regions, most significantly in Wallonia, where
CO2 emissions are 3.58% lower than in the baseline. The emission
reduction is induced by both a reduction in output, overall and of
energy intensive industries, and a shift in the input structure in
production4. As a result of higher input costs, the overall price
level rises, causing a negative impact on competitiveness: exports
decrease by 0.73%. Imports drop less than production, which
indicates a substitution away from domestically produced goods.
In addition to a common labour market, interregional trade could
be a second channel for interregional interactions. Due to data
limitations, however, our model set-up does not accommodate
bilateral trade flows between the regions. The channel of inter-
regional trade could further exacerbate the regional impact varia-
tion, as (intermediate and final) consumption may shift towards
goods produced in other parts of the country, depending on the
changes in competitiveness of the industries in Wallonia relative
to those in the other regions. However, if firms in Wallonia import
a substantial share of intermediate goods from the neighbouring
regions, the drop in GDP in this region may spill over to the other
regions via a reduction in import demand, affecting exports of
Brussels and Flanders negatively.
In the case where the additional tax revenue is used to reduce
labour taxes (social security contributions), a different picture
appears. The right half of Table 4 shows that replacing labour for
energy taxes results in a small increase the country's GDP,
although production in Wallonia also decreases in this scenario.
Lowering labour taxes leads to a small rise in employment, despite
Table 4
Aggregate results.
Difference (%) with reference (2050) Transfer Scenario Labour Tax Scenario
Brussels Flanders Wallonia Belgium Brussels Flanders Wallonia Belgium
GDP 0.14 0.31 0.85 0.40 0.59 0.05 0.51 0.03
Employment 1.93 0.29 1.99 0.31 3.38 0.30 1.36 0.46
Household cons. 0.34 0.22 0.20 0.22 2.40 0.22 0.00 0.31
Investment 0.11 0.18 0.78 0.26 0.45 0.01 0.59 0.05
CO2 emissions 1.13 2.55 3.58 2.63 0.25 2.61 3.77 2.59
Price index 1.03 0.69
Real wage 0.34 1.17
Exports 0.73 0.22
Imports 0.35 0.14
4 Note that the employment increase in Brussels may intensify commuting
flows towards Belgium's capital. The additional congestion and pollution this may
cause is not taken into account.
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the job loss in Wallonia, and an increase in real wages of 1.17%.
This consequently raises disposable incomes and household con-
sumption. A reduction in carbon intensity brings about a country-
wide reduction in carbon emissions of 2.59%. Note that lowering
pre-existing distortionary (labour) taxes seems to be less of an
economic burden than recycling the revenue by means of a
transfer to households, thereby confirming weak double dividend
claims. Furthermore, the results indicate the potential for a strong
double dividend, a scenario in which both economic (in our
case, an increase in GDP and consumption) and ecological gains
(a reduction in CO2 emissions) can be obtained from an environ-
mental tax reform. Note that the initial level of labour taxes in
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Fig. 1. Sensitivity of results (% change from baseline) w.r.t elasticity of substitution (s2) in the labour-energy-materials nest of production in oil-intensive sectors (6, 7, 8,
12 and 14).
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Belgium is among the highest in Europe, whereas the revenue
from environmental taxes, relative to GDP, is below the EU average
(Eurostat, 2005).
3.3. Sensitivity: the impact of factor substitution
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) set up a general equilibrium model
to study the impact of an environmental tax on output prices,
factor prices and pollution. Their framework includes a ‘clean’ and
a ‘dirty’ sector, where the latter uses a polluting input in the
production process. An analytical solution of the model illustrates
how the burden of the tax on the polluting input falls on different
input factors depending on substitution elasticities and factor
intensities in production. The authors distinguish an ‘output
effect’, indicating lower factor demand due to decreased output
levels of the ‘dirty’ sector, and a ‘substitution effect’, describing the
shift away from the polluting input towards other factors of
production. Numerical simulations identify the elasticities of
substitution between the polluting input and labour or capital in
the production of the ‘dirty’ sector as a crucial parameter for the
incidence of environmental taxes. Therefore, this section studies
the sensitivity of the results presented in Section 3.2 with respect
to the elasticity of substitution in the labour-energy-materials nest
(s2, see Fig. A.2) in the production of the oil-intensive industries5.
The theoretical results of Fullerton and Heutel can serve as a guide
to explain our results. However, the analysis performed here
differs in a few important ways from their analytical model. First,
we study a budget neutral reform, so revenue recycling will have
an important feedback on the results. Second, changes in competi-
tiveness affect industries via international trade. Third, by employ-
ing a CGE model, we include intersectoral linkages via intermediate
consumption. Factor intensities vary across sectors as observed by
input-output data.
Inspired by Canova (1994) and Cozzi (2012), we perform a
Monte Carlo calibration in which we draw the value for s2 from a
uniform distribution between 0.01 and 1.5 in each of the 100
model runs. Fig. 1 presents the outcome of this exercise by plotting
the results of the two scenarios against different levels of the
substitution elasticity s2. For s2 equal to 0.5, the results match
the numbers in Table 4. Panel A illustrates the sensitivity of the
reduction in carbon emissions. As highlighted by Fullerton and
Heutel (2007), the impact variation of pollution is substantial,
ranging from around 2% to over 3.5% for high levels of the
substitution elasticity. A stronger shift away from energy inputs
towards labour and intermediate inputs (materials) results in
lower CO2 emissions. Consequently, the additional oil excise tax
revenue falls for higher values of the substitution elasticity s2
(panel B). Although both scenarios simulate an increase of oil
excises of 100%, the oil tax revenues only increase by 77–85% due
to behavioural reactions: reduced consumption of oil-intensive
goods, lower production levels of oil-intensive industries and the
substitution of oil for other inputs in the production process.
When oil intensive firms can more readily replace energy with
labour and materials in the production process, the relative
demand for labour will rise. As a consequence, real wages increase.
This is illustrated in panel C of Fig. 1 and indicates that the
‘substitution effect’ is becoming more important relative to the
‘output effect’. Capital becomes a relatively worse substitute for
energy compared to labour and materials. Therefore, capital bears
more of the tax burden when the value of s2 increases, as shown
in panel D.
The sensitivity of household consumption (panel E) demon-
strates the importance of the chosen revenue recycling mechanism.
When firms are more flexible in replacing energy in the production
process, the tax revenues that can be transferred to the households
in the Transfer Scenario are lower. Although the negative impact on
wages is mitigated by better substitution, the decreased transfer
levels lead to a smaller increase in household consumption. When
the additional revenue is recycled by lowering labour taxes (Labour
Tax Scenario), however, the stronger increase in real wages leads to
higher levels of household consumption (0.27–0.36% increase
compared to the baseline levels). Panel F of Fig. 1 indicates that
lower levels of household consumption lead to a greater decrease in
GDP in the Transfer Scenario. In the Labour Tax Scenario, GDP levels
drop when s2 rises, in spite of increasing domestic household
consumption. The shift of oil-intensive firms towards labour and
materials causes an upward pressure on the prices of these inputs.
As a consequence, the competitive position of some export-oriented
(labour-intensive) industry branches deteriorates. The resulting fall
in exports drives the GDP levels down. Note that the sign of the
change in GDP in the Labour Tax Scenario is affected by the value of
the substitution elasticity: when s2 exceeds approximately 0.75,
GDP is lower than in the baseline.
3.4. Distributional impact
Next, we turn to the impact of the reform on income distribu-
tion. Fig. 2 presents differences between monthly disposable
income per income decile before and after the reform. Absolute
differences DA;d (displayed in panel A of Fig. 2, € per month) and
relative differences DB;d (panel B) per income decile d ðd¼ 1;…;10Þ
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Fig. 2. Absolute (A) and relative (B) changes in monthly disposable household
income (€).
5 More specifically, we vary s2 in the sectors with the highest share of oil
excises paid relative to output: sectors 6, 7, 8, 12 and 14 (see Table 1).
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are calculated as
DA;d ¼
∑kAdw0;ky0;k
∑kAdw0;k
∑kAdw1;ky1;k
∑kAdw1;k
DB;d ¼DA;d
∑kAdw0;ky0;k
∑kAdw0;k
 
where w0;k and w1;k are the weights of household k before and
after the reform, y0;k and y1;k their disposable incomes respec-
tively. Because consumption needs do not increase proportionally
with household size, we divide the disposable incomes by the
square root of the number of household members (OECD equiva-
lence scale). Also note that income deciles before and after the
policy change may differ in composition, because income deciles
after the reform are constructed on the basis of altered weights
and pre-reform incomes.
Fig. 2 shows that the distributional effects vary strongly accord-
ing to the way the additional revenue is recycled. Increased welfare
payments (Transfer Scenario) seem to benefit mostly the lower
income deciles. This is not surprising, since the share of pensioners
and unemployed is higher in these income groups. However,
higher excise levies impose a burden on the industry sectors. The
increased production costs lead to higher consumption prices.
Furthermore, the transfer scenario entails reductions in real wages
(0.34%), capital (1.20%) and self-employment income (1.12%),
which mostly harm higher income groups. The shift from labour to
energy taxation (Labour Tax Scenario), on the other hand, appears
to be slightly regressive. Reduced labour taxes lead to an increase
of overall employment and the real wage rises. However, the lower
income deciles hardly gain from the moderate real wage increase of
1.17% because labour incomes and employment rates in these
income groups are lower. They are worse off because the overall
price level rises as a consequence of higher production costs and
more excises paid by consumers. The gains of households at the
higher end of the income distribution are limited by a decrease in
capital (0.76%) and self-employment income (0.64%).
Panel B of Fig. 2, displaying gains and losses relative to disposable
income, leads to the same conclusion: redistributing the additional
energy tax revenue through welfare transfers is beneficial for lower
income households, while labour tax reductions may give rise to
increasing inequality. The error bars in both panels of Fig. 2 match the
upper and lower bounds of the results for the extreme values
considered in the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.3 (s2¼0.01 and
s2¼1.5). The conclusions of the distributional analysis do not appear
to be very volatile with respect to variations in the substitution
elasticity s2. Remark that high values of s2 lead to larger falls in the
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Fig. 3. Decomposition of the (absolute) effects on income distribution. (a) Before reweighting and price change, (b) After reweighting, before price change, (c) Before
reweighting, after price change and (d) After reweighting and price change.
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return on capital. This is illustrated by the downward sensitivity of
income changes of the highest income group.
3.5. Decomposition
In this section, we zoom in on the distributional effects of
employment, factor income and consumption price changes. Fig. 3
decomposes the overall impact by displaying intermediate results
(panel D shows the final result, as in panel A of Fig. 2).
Panel A shows absolute differences in disposable income after
taking into account factor income changes and variations in
benefit entitlements (in EUROMOD). The sources side seems to
be crucial in determining the impact variation across income
deciles. More details on the initial distribution of factor incomes
can be found in Fig. C.1 in Appendix C.
Panel B illustrates the impact of employment changes, included by
changing sample weights. This figure largely shows the same structure
as in panel A. Although the changes in weight differ by disposable
income (as is shown in Fig. 4, withw1;kw0;k on the vertical axes), the
relatively small changes in employment do not seem to change the
conclusions that could be drawn from panel A. Possibly, an explicit
modelling of labour supply reactions at the intensive and extensive
margin, as is done in discrete labour supply models, is more suitable to
address distributional concerns of employment changes.
We move from panels A–C in Fig. 3 by incorporating consumption
price changes based on household specific expenditure patterns. The
increase in price level shifts the picture of panel A in Fig. 3 downwards.
Consumption prices increase for two reasons. First, higher excises on
the household side raise final consumption prices. Second, increased
excise levies raise the production costs for firms directly (oil used in
the production process) and via more expensive intermediate goods.
Reducing labour taxes partially offsets the latter effect by lowering
production costs. Therefore, the price increase in the Transfer Scenario
is more substantial. This is illustrated by the slightly larger downward
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Fig. 4. Difference between new and old weights in the Transfer (A) and Labour Tax (B) Scenario.
Table 5
Price changes by consumption categories.
Expenditure categories Price changes
Transfer Scenario Labour Tax Scenario
1. Food, beverages and tobacco 0.3 0.1
2. Clothing and footwear 0.4 0.1
3. Housing and water expenses 0.3 0.0
4. Fuels and power 0.8 0.6
5. Housing furniture and operation 0.3 0.0
6. Heating and cooking appliances 0.2 0.0
7. Medical care and health expenses 0.5 0.1
8. Transport equipment 0.2 0.0
9. Operation of transport equipment 14.3 14
10. Purchased transport 1.2 0.8
11. Telecommunication services 0.3 0.0
12. Recreation, entertainment, etc. 0.4 0.0
13. Other services 0.4 0.1
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shift in the case of revenue recycling via welfare payments. However,
the contribution of the household specific price changes to the impact
variation across deciles appears to play a minor role. A first explana-
tion can be found in Fig. 5. This figure plots the household specific
price indices (CPIk) against disposable incomes. For the Transfer
Scenario, the value of the price index ranges from 1.003 to 1.15. In
the Labour Tax Scenario, price changes vary from nearly 0% (price
index equal to 1) to 1.2% (CPLk¼1.012). A clear increasing or decreasing
trend is absent in both scenarios, indicating that the impact of the
prices changes is not particularly concentrated in specific ranges of the
income distribution.
A clearer picture can be drawn when we use the price changes by
consumption category displayed in Table 5. The increase in excises on
oil mainly raises prices of transport fuels (category 9). Price increases
for heating fuels (category 4) and public transport (category 10) are
rather limited. This can be explained by the importance of the excise
component (paid by consumers) in transport fuels. The use of heating
fuels is more diversified, as many households use heating systems
based on electricity and natural gas. The price increases of other goods
categories are minimal because the share of oil excises (paid by
producers) in total production costs is limited. Since the burden of
excises mostly falls on transport fuels and budget shares of this
category are not decreasing by income decile (as shown in Table 3),
the impact on inequality is ambiguous.
3.6. Winners and losers
To illustrate the richness of microdata, we can decompose the
impact by household characteristics. CGE models with representative
households usually lack the details to do this kind of analysis. A more
refined view of the household groups that are affected by the policy
reform may provide valuable information for policymakers, especially
when the policy change is part of a larger reform package. An
insightful way to map the effects by household characteristics is by
ranking households according to how they are affected by the policy
reform (from biggest loss to largest gain) and then grouping them in
quintiles. Table 6 describes some characteristics of these quintiles. The
households for which the burden is largest in the Transfer Scenario are
highly dependent on employment income6 and receive low amounts
of welfare payments. Moreover, these households spend a larger than
average share of their budget on transport fuels. Households benefit-
ting from the reform tend to be smaller and contain on average more
elderly (aged over 60) and less children. A potential explanation is that
households with pensioners receive more welfare payments (pen-
sions). The highest education level (ranging from 0 to 5) in households
that gain seems to be lower than average. This may be explained by a
positive correlation between education level and employment income.
The second part of Table 6 presents the same information for the
Labour Tax Scenario. Households that benefit from reduced labour
taxes tend to rely heavily on employment income, have a higher
education level and include less people with an age of 60 or higher.
4. Conclusions
We analyse aggregate and distributional effects of increased
excise levies on oil in Belgium. Revenue is recycled either by
raising welfare payments or by reducing employers' social security
contributions (labour taxes). In terms of methodology, we follow a
recent strand of the literature that attempts to link CGE models
with a (non-behavioural) microsimulation framework. The main
benefit of this approach is that it includes general equilibrium
feedbacks and endogenous price changes, but nevertheless
exploits the rich set of details of microlevel data. A number of
conclusions can be drawn.
First, the results suggest the existence of a weak double
dividend. On the country level, GDP drops when additional
revenue is handed out to households as a transfer. When labour
taxes are reduced, the country's GDP slightly increases (depending
on parameter values), which indicates the potential for a strong
double dividend. Second, we point out important regional impact
differences. Due to the sector composition, GDP in the region that
hosts more energy intensive industries (Wallonia) decreases in
both scenarios. Since this region has lower per capita production
levels to start with, both scenarios give rise to a regional diver-
gence in economic activity. Third, using additional tax revenue
to increase welfare benefits results in gains for lower income
households. A reduction in wage and return to capital makes high
income deciles worse off in this scenario. When the revenue is
recycled through lower labour taxes, the environmental tax
reform is slightly regressive. However, the key message to policy-
makers is that the regressive impact of higher oil excises can be
Table 6
Impact by household characteristics.
Characteristics of winners and losers Quintiles
Av. 20% losers 2 3 4 20% winners
Transfer Scenario
Share employment income in disp. income (%) 74.81 137.28 128.21 88.42 15.56 4.68
Share transfers in disposable income (%) 42.05 2.23 3.67 20.80 82.90 100.50
Highest education level in household 3.52 4.47 3.96 3.41 2.78 2.95
Share ‘private transport’ expenditures (%) 3.98 4.31 4.67 4.14 3.42 3.34
Household size 2.43 3.37 2.73 2.16 1.80 2.08
Number of people aged over 60 per household 0.39 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.69 1.09
Number of people aged under 18 per household 0.29 0.51 0.40 0.26 0.14 0.10
Absolute gain or loss () 0.30 75.57 36.57 1.66 41.40 73.97
Labour Tax Scenario
Share employment income in disp. income (%) 74.81 6.95 8.83 67.57 136.37 154.29
Share transfers in disposable income (%) 42.05 70.54 88.39 41.80 6.58 2.94
Highest education level in household 3.52 3.55 2.65 3.13 3.81 4.43
Share ‘private transport’ expenditures (%) 3.98 3.95 3.53 3.77 4.70 3.93
Household size 2.43 2.43 1.79 2.18 2.57 3.17
Number of people aged over 60 per household 0.39 0.82 0.79 0.26 0.04 0.03
Number of people aged under 18 per household 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.35 0.42
Absolute gain or loss () 2.36 17.01 6.22 0.84 9.56 26.33
6 Note that these numbers involve pre-tax incomes, such that the share can
exceed 100%.
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offset by targeted revenue recycling. Fourth, the distributional
effects seem to be driven by sources side effects (relative factor
prices). Effects on the uses side (relative consumption prices) do
not contribute much to the impact variation because the increase
in oil excises mainly falls on transport fuels, which do not
particularly take up a larger share of expenditures for lower
income households.
The methodology applied in this paper can be refined in several
ways. First, the CGE model could be extended to incorporate
different skill levels of workers. A differential impact on wages
for low-skilled versus high-skilled workers can be an additional
determinant of the incidence of energy taxes. In addition, labour
market imperfections (e.g. involuntary unemployment and imper-
fect labour mobility) and interregional trade could be included in
the CGE model. Second, one could use a discrete choice labour
supply model (e.g. taking into account heterogeneous opportu-
nities for different individuals, as in Aaberge and Colombino, 2013)
to derive household employment decisions. This way, a more
realistic view could be given on who gains from job creation by
modelling explicitly who is likely to fill in new positions.
Third, and most fundamental, a fully integrated approach with a
CGE model based on microdata could be adopted to combine
the advantages of general equilibrium and micro-level modelling
tools (see Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). Given the growing interest
in the distributional consequences of policy reforms, future
research efforts that align macro and micro perspectives in an
integrated manner will provide valuable information for political
choices.
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Appendix A. Structure of consumption and production in CGE
model
See Figs. A1 and A2.
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Appendix B. Matching production sectors
See Table B1.
Appendix C. Income distribution by source
See Fig. C1.
Table B.1
The combination of sectoral info from the CGE and microdata results in seven industry sectors.
Sectors after linking Microsimulation CGE
1 Agriculture and fishing 1 Agriculture and fishing 1 Agriculture
2 Mining, manifact. and utilities 2 Mining, manifact. and utilities 2 Coal
3 Crude oil and refined oil products
4 Natural gas
5 Electric power
6 Ferrous and non-fer. ore and metals
7 Chemical products
8 Other energy intensive ind.
9 Electrical goods
10 Transport equipment
11 Other equipment goods
12 Consumer goods industries
3 Construction 3 Construction 13 Building and construction
4 Other market services 4 Wholesale and retail 17 Other market services
5 Hotels and restaurants
8 Real estate and business
5 Transport and communication 6 Transport and communication 14 Land transport
15 Other transport
6 Financial intermediation 7 Financial intermediation 16 Credit and insurance
7 Non-market services 9 Public administ. and defence 18 Non-market services
10 Education
11 Health and social work
12 Other
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Fig. C.1. Distribution of income by source (€ per month, EU-SILC 2006).
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